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Abstract
We propose three new robust aggregation rules
for distributed synchronous Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD) under a general Byzantine failure
model. The attackers can arbitrarily manipulate
the data transferred between the servers and the
workers in the parameter server (PS) architecture.
We prove the Byzantine resilience properties of
these aggregation rules. Empirical analysis shows
that the proposed techniques outperform current
approaches for realistic use cases and Byzantine
attack scenarios.
1. Introduction
The failure resilience of distributed machine-learning sys-
tems has attracted increasing attention (Blanchard et al.,
2017; Chen et al., 2017) in the community. Larger clusters
can accelerate training. However, this makes the distributed
system more vulnerable to different kinds of failures or even
attacks, including crashes and computation errors, stalled
processes, or compromised sub-systems (Harinath et al.,
2017). Thus, failure/attack resilience is becoming more and
more important for distributed machine-learning systems,
especially for large-scale deep learning (Dean et al., 2012;
McMahan et al., 2017).
In this paper, we consider the most general failure model,
Byzantine failures (Lamport et al., 1982), where the attack-
ers can know any information of the other processes, and
attack any value in transmission. To be more specific, the
data transmission between the machines can be replaced by
arbitrary values. Under such model, there are no constraints
on the failures or attackers.
The distributed training framework studied in this paper is
the Parameter Server (PS). The PS architecture is composed
of the server nodes and the worker nodes. The server nodes
maintain a global copy of the model, aggregate the gradi-
ents from the workers, apply the gradients to the model,
and broadcast the latest model to the workers. The worker
nodes pull the latest model from the server nodes, compute
the gradients according to the local portion of the training
data, and send the gradients to the server nodes. The entire
dataset and the corresponding workload is distributed to
multiple worker nodes, thus parallelizing the computation
via partitioning the dataset. There exist several distributed
machine learning systems using the PS architecture. For
instance, Tensorflow (Abadi et al., 2016), CNTK (Seide &
Agarwal, 2016), and MXNet (Chen et al., 2015) implement
internal PS’s.
In this paper, we study the Byzantine resilience of syn-
chronous Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), which is a
popular class of learning algorithms using PS architecture.
Its variants are widely used in training deep neural net-
works (Kingma & Ba, 2014; Mukkamala & Hein, 2017).
Such algorithms always wait to collect gradients from all
the worker nodes before moving on to the next iteration.
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Figure 1. The 2 figures visualize 5 workers with 8-dimensional
gradients. The ith row represents the gradient vector produced by
the ith worker. The jth column represents the jth dimension of
the gradients. A shadow block represents that the corresponding
value is replaced by a Byzantine value. In the two examples, the
maximal number of Byzantine values for each dimension is 2. For
the classic Byzantine model, all the Byzantine values must lie
in the same workers (rows), while for the generalized Byzantine
model there is no such constraint. Thus, (a) is a special case of (b).
The failure model can be described by using an n×d matrix
consisting of the d-dimensional gradients produced by n
workers, as visualized in Figure 1. A previous work (Blan-
chard et al., 2017) discusses a special case of our failure
model, where the Byzantine values must lie in the same
rows (workers) as shown in Figure 1(a). Our failure model
generalize the classic Byzantine failure model by placing
the Byzantine values anywhere in the matrix without any
constraint.
There are many possible types of attacks. In general, the
attackers want to disturb the model training, i.e., make SGD
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converge slowly or converge to a bad solution. We list some
of the possible attacks in the following three paragraphs.
We name the most general type of attacks as gamber. The
attackers can change a portion of data on the communication
media such as the wires or the network interfaces. The
attackers randomly pick the data and maliciously change
them (e.g., multiply them by a large negative value). As
a result, on the server nodes, the collected gradients are
partially replaced by arbitrary values.
Another possible type of attack is called omniscient. The
attackers are supposed to know the gradients sent by all the
workers, and use the sum of all the gradients, scaled by a
large negative value, to replace some of the gradient vectors.
The goal is to mislead SGD to go into an opposite direction
with a large step size.
There are also some weaker attacks, such as Gaussian attack,
where some of the gradient vectors are replaced by random
vectors sampled from a Gaussian distribution with large
variances. Such attackers do not require any information
from the workers.
With the generalized Byzantine failure model, we ask that
using what aggregation rules and on what conditions, the
synchronous SGD can still converge to good solutions. We
propose novel median-based aggregation rules, with which
SGD is Byzantine resilient on a certain condition: for each
dimension, in all the n values provided by the n workers,
the number of Byzantine values must be less than half of n.
Such Byzantine resilience property is called “dimensional
Byzantine resilience”. The main contributions of this paper
are listed below:
• We propose three aggregation rules for synchronous SGD
with provable convergence to critical points: geometric
median (Definition 6), marginal median (Definition 7),
and “mean around median” (Definition 8). As far as we
know, this paper is the first to theoretically and empiri-
cally study median-based aggregation rules under non-
convex settings.
• We show that the three proposed robust aggregation rules
have low computation cost. The time complexities are
nearly linear, which are in the same order of the default
choice for non-Byzantine aggregation, i.e., averaging.
• We formulate the dimensional Byzantine resilience prop-
erty, and prove that marginal median and “mean around
median” are dimensional Byzantine-resilient (Defini-
tion 5). As far as we know, this paper is the first one
to study generalized Byzantine failures and dimensional
Byzantine resilience for synchronous SGD.
2. Model
We consider the Parameter Server architecture consisting of
n workers. The goal is to find the optimizer of the following
problem:
min
x
E [f(x, ξ)] ,
where the expectation is with respect to the random variable
ξ. The PS executes synchronous SGD for distributed train-
ing. In each round, the server nodes collect n gradients from
the workers. In the tth round, the server nodes aggregate the
gradients {v˜ti : i ∈ [n]} from the workers, and broadcast
the updated parameters xt+1 to the workers. v˜ti is the vector
sent by the ith worker in the tth round, potentially Byzantine.
Using aggregation ruleAggr(·), the server nodes update the
parameters as follows:
xt+1 ← xt − γtAggr({v˜ti : i ∈ [n]}),
where γt is the learning rate. The worker nodes pull the
latest parameters from the server nodes, compute the gradi-
ents according to the local portion of the training data, and
send the gradients to the server nodes. Without the Byzan-
tine failures, the ith worker will calculate vti ∼ Gt, where
Gt = ∇f(xt, ξ). With Byzantine failures, vti are partially
replaced by any arbitrary values, which results v˜ti .
Since the Byzantine failure assumes the worst cases, the
attackers may have full knowledge of the entire system,
including the gradients generated by all the workers, and
the aggregation rule Aggr(·). The malicious processes can
even collaborate with each other (Lynch, 1996).
3. Byzantine Resilience
In this section, we formally define the classic Byzantine
resilience property and its generalized version: dimensional
Byzantine resilience.
Suppose that in a specific round, the correct vectors {vi :
i ∈ [n]} are i.i.d samples drawn from the random variable
G = ∇f(x, ξ), where E[G] = g is an unbiased estimator
of the gradient. Thus, E[vi] = E[G] = g, for any i ∈ [n].
We simplify the notations by ignoring the index of round t.
We first introduce the classic Byzantine model proposed by
Blanchard et al. (2017). With the Byzantine workers, the
actual vectors {v˜i : i ∈ [n]} received by the server nodes
are as follows:
Definition 1 (Classic Byzantine Model).
v˜i =
{
vi, if the ith worker is correct,
arbitrary, if the ith worker is Byzantine.
(1)
Note that the indices of Byzantine workers can change
throughout different rounds. Furthermore, the server nodes
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are not aware of which workers are Byzantine. The only
information given is the number of Byzantine workers, if
necessary.
We directly use the same definition of classic Byzantine
resilience proposed in (Blanchard et al., 2017).
Definition 2. (Classic (α, q)-Byzantine Resilience). Let
0 ≤ α < pi/2 be any angular value, and any integer 0 ≤
q ≤ n. Let {vi : i ∈ [n]} be any i.i.d. random vectors
in Rd, vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g. Let {v˜i : i ∈ [n]} be
the set of vectors, of which up to q of them are replaced
by arbitrary vectors in Rd, while the others still equal to
the corresponding {vi}. Aggregation rule Aggr(·) is said
to be classic (α, q)-Byzantine resilient if Aggr({v˜i : i ∈
[n]}) satisfies (i) 〈E[Aggr], g〉 ≥ (1 − sinα)‖g‖2 > 0
and (ii) for r = 2, 3, 4, E‖Aggr‖r is bounded above by a
linear combination of terms E‖G‖r1 , . . . ,E‖G‖rn−q with
r1 + . . .+ rn−q = r.
The baseline algorithm Krum, denoted as Krum({v˜i : i ∈
[n]}) (Blanchard et al., 2017), is defined as follows
Definition 3.
Krum({v˜i : i ∈ [n]}) = v˜k,
k = argmin
i∈[n]
∑
i→j
‖v˜i − v˜j‖2,
where i→ j is the indices of the n−q−2 nearest neighbours
of v˜i in {v˜i : i ∈ [n]} measured by Euclidean distance.
The Krum aggregation is classic (α, q)-Byzantine resilient
under certain assumptions:
Lemma 1 (Blanchard et al. (2017)). Let v1, . . . , vn be any
i.i.d. random d-dimensional vectors s.t. vi ∼ G, with
E[G] = g and E‖G − g‖2 = dσ2. q of {vi : i ∈ [n]} are
replaced by arbitrary d-dimensional vectors b1, . . . , bq. If
2q + 2 < n and η0(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, where
η20(n, q) = 2
(
n− q + q(n− q − 2) + q
2(n− q − 1)
n− 2q − 2
)
,
then the Krum function is classic (α0, q)-Byzantine re-
silient where 0 ≤ α0 < pi/2 is defined by sinα0 =
η0(n,q)
√
dσ
‖g‖ .
The generalized Byzantine model is denoted as:
Definition 4 (Generalized Byzantine Model).
(v˜i)j =
{
(vi)j , if the the jth dimension of vi is correct,
arbitrary, otherwise,
(2)
where (vi)j is the jth dimension of the vector vi.
Based on the Byzantine model above, we introduce a gen-
eralized Byzantine resilience property, dimensional (α, q)-
Byzantine resilience, which is defined as follows:
Definition 5. (Dimensional (α, q)-Byzantine Resilience).
Let 0 ≤ α < pi/2 be any angular value, and any integer
0 ≤ q ≤ n. Let {vi : i ∈ [n]} be any i.i.d. random vectors
in Rd, vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g. Let {v˜i : i ∈ [n]} be the
set of vectors. For each dimension, up to q of the n values
are replaced by arbitrary values, i.e., for dimension j ∈ [d],
q of {(v˜i)j : i ∈ [n]} are Byzantine, where (v˜i)j is the jth
dimension of the vector v˜i. Aggregation ruleAggr(·) is said
to be dimensional (α, q)-Byzantine resilient if Aggr({v˜i :
i ∈ [n]}) satisfies (i) 〈E[Aggr], g〉 ≥ (1− sinα)‖g‖2 > 0
and (ii) for r = 2, 3, 4, E‖Aggr‖r is bounded above by a
linear combination of terms E‖G‖r1 , . . . ,E‖G‖rn−q with
r1 + . . .+ rn−q = r.
Note that classic (α, q)-Byzantine resilience is a special
case of dimensional (α, q)-Byzantine resilience. For classic
Byzantine resilience defined in Definition 2, all the Byzan-
tine values must lie in the same subset of workers, as shown
in Figure 1(a).
In the following theorems, we show that Mean and Krum
are not dimensional Byzantine resilient. The proofs are
provided in the appendix.
Theorem 1. Averaging is not dimensional Byzantine re-
silient.
Theorem 2. Any aggregation rule Aggr({v˜i : i ∈ [n]})
that outputs Aggr ∈ {v˜i : i ∈ [n]} is not dimensional
Byzantine resilient.
Note that Krum chooses the vector v ∈ {v˜i : i ∈ [n]} with
the minimal score. Thus, based on the theorem above, we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Krum(·) is not dimensional Byzantine re-
silient.
If an aggregation rule is dimensional/classic (α, q)-
Byzantine resilient with satisfied assumptions, it converges
to critical points almost surely, by reusing the Proposition 2
in (Blanchard et al., 2017). We provide the following lemma
without proof.
Lemma 2 (Blanchard et al. (2017)). Assume that (i) the
cost function f is three times differentiable with continu-
ous derivatives, and is non-negative, f(x) ≥ 0; (ii) the
learning rates satisfy
∑
t γt = ∞ and
∑
t γ
2
t < ∞; (iii)
the gradient estimator satisfies E[∇f(x, ξ)] = ∇F (x) and
∀r ∈ {2, 3, 4}, E‖∇f(x, ξ)‖r ≤ Ar + Br‖x‖r for some
constants Ar, Br; (iv) there exists a constant 0 ≤ α < pi/2
such that for all x η(n, q)
√
dσ(x) ≤ ‖∇F (x)‖ sinα, where
dσ2(x) = E‖∇f(x, ξ) − ∇F (x)‖2; (v) finally, beyond
a certain horizon, ‖x‖2 ≥ D, there exist  > 0 and
0 ≤ β < pi/2 − α such that ‖∇F (x)‖ ≥  > 0, and
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〈x,∇F (x)〉
‖x‖·‖∇F (x)‖ ≥ cosβ. Then the sequence of gradients
∇F (xt) converges almost surely to zero, if the aggrega-
tion rule satisfies (α, q)-Byzantine Resilience defined in
Definition 2 or 5.
4. Median-based Aggregation
With the Byzantine failure model defined in Equation (1)
and (2), we propose three median-based aggregation rules,
which are Byzantine resilient under certain conditions.
4.1. Geometric Median
The geometric median is used as a robust estimator of
mean (Chen et al., 2017).
Definition 6. The geometric median of {v˜i : i ∈ [n]},
denoted by GeoMed({v˜i : i ∈ [n]}), is defined as
λ = GeoMed({v˜i : i ∈ [n]}) = argmin
v∈Rd
n∑
i=1
‖v − v˜i‖.
The following theorem shows the classic (α1, q)-Byzantine
resilience of geometric median. A proof is provided in the
appendix.
Theorem 3. Let v1, . . . , vn be any i.i.d. random d-
dimensional vectors s.t. vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and
E‖G− g‖2 = dσ2. q of {vi : i ∈ [n]} are replaced by arbi-
trary d-dimensional vectors b1, . . . , bq . If q ≤ dn2 e − 1 and
η1(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, where η1(n, q) = 2n−2qn−2q
√
n− q, then
the GeoMed function is classic (α1, q)-Byzantine resilient
where 0 ≤ α1 < pi/2 is defined by sinα1 = η1(n,q)
√
dσ
‖g‖ .
4.2. Marginal Median
The marginal median is another generalization of one-
dimensional median.
Definition 7. We define the marginal median aggregation
rule MarMed(·) as
µ =MarMed({v˜i : i ∈ [n]}),
where for any j ∈ [d], the jth dimension of µ is µj =
median ({(v˜1)j , . . . , (v˜n)j}), (v˜i)j is the jth dimension of
the vector v˜i, median(·) is the one-dimensional median.
The following theorem claims that by using MarMed(·),
the resulting vector is dimensional (α2, q)-Byzantine re-
silient. A proof is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 4. Let v1, . . . , vn be any i.i.d. random d-
dimensional vectors s.t. vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and
E‖G − g‖2 = dσ2. For any dimension j ∈ [d], q of
{(v1)j , . . . , (vn)j} are replaced by arbitrary values, where
(vi)j is the jth dimension of the vector vi. If q ≤ dn2 e − 1
and η2(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, where η2(n, q) = √n− q, then
the MarMed function is dimensional (α2, q)-Byzantine
resilient where 0 ≤ α2 < pi/2 is defined by sinα2 =
η2(n,q)
√
dσ
‖g‖ .
4.3. Beyond Median
We can also utilize more values for each dimension along
with the median, if q is given or easily estimated. To be
more specific, for each dimension, we take the average of
the n−q values nearest to the median (including the median
itself). We call the resulting aggregation rule “mean around
median”, which is defined as follows:
Definition 8. We define the mean-around-median aggrega-
tion rule MeaMed(·) as
ρ =MeaMed({v˜i : i ∈ [n]}),
where for any j ∈ [d], the jth dimension of ρ is ρj =
1
n−q
∑
µj→i(v˜i)j , µj → i is the indices of the top-(n− q)
values lying in {(v˜1)j , . . . , (v˜n)j} nearest to the median µj ,
(v˜i)j is the jth dimension of the vector v˜i.
We show that MeaMed is dimensional (α3, q)-Byzantine
resilient.
Theorem 5. Let v1, . . . , vn be any i.i.d. random d-
dimensional vectors s.t. vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and
E‖G − g‖2 = dσ2. For any dimension j ∈ [d], q of
{(v1)j , . . . , (vn)j} are replaced by arbitrary values, where
(vi)j is the jth dimension of the vector vi. If q ≤ dn2 e−1 and
η3(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, where η3(n, q) =
√
10(n− q), then
the MeaMed function is dimensional (α3, q)-Byzantine
resilient where 0 ≤ α3 < pi/2 is defined by sinα3 =
η3(n,q)
√
dσ
‖g‖ .
The mean-around-median aggregation can be viewed as a
trimmed average centering at the median, which filters out
the values far away from the median.
4.4. Time Complexity
For geometric medianGeoMed(·), there are no closed-form
solutions. The (1+)-approximate geometric median can be
computed in O(dn log3 1 ) time (Cohen et al., 2016), which
is nearly linear to O(dn). To compute the marginal median
MarMed(·), we only need to compute the median value of
each dimension. The simplest way is to apply any sorting
algorithm to each dimension, which yields the time complex-
ity O(dn log n). To obtian median values, there also exists
an algorithm called selection algorithm (Blum et al., 1973)
with average time complexity O(n) (O(n2) in the worst
case). Thus, we can get the marginal median with time
complexity O(dn) on average, which is in the same order
of using mean value for aggregation. For MeaMed(·), the
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computation additional to computing the marginal median
takes linear time O(dn). Thus, the time complexity is the
same as MarMed(·). Note that for Krum and Multi-Krum,
the time complexity is O(dn2) (Blanchard et al., 2017).
5. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the convergence and Byzan-
tine resilience properties of the proposed algorithms. We
consider two image classification tasks: handwritten digits
classification on MNIST dataset using multi-layer percep-
tron (MLP) with two hidden layers, and object recognition
on convolutional neural network (CNN) with five convolu-
tional layers and two fully-connected layers. The details
of these two neural networks can be found in the appendix.
There are n = 20 worker processes. We repeat each ex-
periment for ten times and take the average. To make the
conditions as fair as possible for all the algorithms, we en-
sure that all the algorithms are run with the same set of
random seeds. The details of the datasets and the default
hyperparameters of the corresponding models are listed in
Table 1. We use top-1 or top-3 accuracy on testing sets (dis-
joint with the training sets) as evaluation metrics.
The baseline aggregation rules are Mean, Medoid,
Krum (Definition 3), and Multi-Krum. Medoid, defined
as follows, is a computation-efficient version of geometric
median.
Definition 9. The medoid of {v˜i : i ∈ [n]}, denoted by
Medoid({v˜i : i ∈ [n]}), is defined as Medoid({v˜i : i ∈
[n]}) = argminv∈{v˜i:i∈[n]}
∑n
i=1 ‖v − v˜i‖.
Multi-Krum is a variant of Krum defined in Blanchard
et al. (2017), which takes the average on several vectors
selected by multiple rounds of Krum. We compare these
baseline algorithms with the proposed algorithms: geomet-
ric median (GeoMed defined in Definition 6), marginal me-
dian (MarMed defined in Definition 7), and “mean around
median” (MeaMed defined in Definition 8) under different
settings in the following subsections.
Note that all the experiments of CNN on CIFAR10 show
similar results with the experiments of MLP on MNIST.
Thus, we only show the results of CNN in Section 5.5 as
an example. The remaining results are provided in the
appendix.
5.1. Convergence without Byzantine Failures
First, we evaluate the convergence without Byzantine fail-
ures. The goal is to empirically evaluate the bias and vari-
ance caused by the robust aggregation rules.
In Figure 10, we show the top-1 accuracy on the testing
set of MNIST. The gaps between different algorithms are
tiny. Among all the algorithms, Multi-Krum, GeoMed, and
MeaMed have the least bias. They act just the same as
averaging. MarMed converges slightly slower. Medoid
and Krum both have slowest convergence.
5.2. Gaussian Attack
We test classic Byzantine resilience in this experiment. We
consider the attackers that replace some of the gradient
vectors with Gaussian random vectors with zero mean and
isotropic covariance matrix with standard deviation 200. We
refer to this kind of attack as Gaussian Attack. Within the
figure, we also include the averaging without Byzantine
failures as a baseline. 6 out of the 20 gradient vectors are
Byzantine. The results are shown in Figure 3. As expected,
averaging is not Byzantine resilient. The gaps between all
the other algorithms are still tiny. GeoMed and MeaMed
performs like there are no Byzantine failures at all. Multi-
Krum and MarMed converges slightly slower. Medoid and
Krum performs worst. Although Medoid is not Byzantine
resilient, the Gaussian attack is weak enough so that Medoid
is still effective.
5.3. Omniscient Attack
We test classic Byzantine resilience in this experiment. This
kind of attacker is assumed to know the all the correct gra-
dients. For each Byzantine gradient vector, the gradient
is replaced by the negative sum of all the correct gradi-
ents, scaled by a large constant (1e20 in the experiments).
Roughly speaking, this attack tries to make the parameter
server go into the opposite direction with a long step. 6 out
of the 20 gradient vectors are Byzantine. The results are
shown in Figure 4. MeaMed still performs just like there
is no failure. Multi-Krum is not as good as MeaMed, but
the gap is small. Krum converges slower but still converges
to the same accuracy. However, GeoMed and MarBed con-
verge to bad solutions. Mean and Medoid are not tolerant to
this attack.
5.4. Bit-flip Attack
We test dimensional Byzantine resilience in this experiment.
Knowing the information of other workers can be difficult
in practice. Thus, we use more realistic scenario in this
experiment. The attacker only manipulates some individual
floating numbers by flipping the 22th, 30th, 31th and 32th
bits. Furthermore, we test dimensional Byzantine resilience
in this experiment. For each of the first 1000 dimensions, 1
of the 20 floating numbers is manipulated using the bit-flip
attack. The results are shown in Figure 5. As expected, only
MarMed and MeaMed are dimensional Byzantine resilient.
Note that for Krum and Multi-Krum, their assumption re-
quires the number of Byzantine vectors q to satisfy 2q+2 <
n, which means q ≤ 8 in our experiments. However, be-
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Table 1. Experiment Summary
Dataset # train # test γ # rounds Batchsize Evaluation metric
MNIST (Loosli et al., 2007) 60k 10k 0.1 500 32 top-1 accuracy
CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) 50k 10k 5e-4 4000 128 top-3 accuracy
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Round
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
To
p-
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy
Mean
Krum
Medoid
GeoMed
MarMed
Multi-Krum
MeaMed
(a) MNIST without Byzantine
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Round
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
To
p-
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy
Mean
Krum
Medoid
GeoMed
MarMed
Multi-Krum
MeaMed
(b) MNIST without Byzantine (zoomed)
Figure 2. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST without Byzantine failures.
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Figure 3. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with Gaussian Attack. 6 out of 20 gradient vectors are replaced by i.i.d. random vectors
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and 200 standard deviation.
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Figure 4. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with Omniscient Attack. 6 out of 20 gradient vectors are replaced by the negative sum of all
the correct gradients, scaled by a large constant (1e20 in the experiments).
cause each gradient is partially manipulated, all the n vec-
tors are Byzantine, which breaks the assumption of the
Krum-based algorithms. Furthermore, to compute the dis-
tances to the (n−q−2)-nearest neighbours, n−q−2 must
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Figure 5. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with Bit-flip Attack. For the first 1000 dimensions, 1 of the 20 floating numbers is
manipulated by flipping the 22th, 30th, 31th and 32th bits.
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(b) MNIST with gambler (zoomed)
Figure 6. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with gambler attack. The parameters are evenly assigned to 20 servers. For one single server,
any received value is multiplied by −1e20 with probability 0.05%.
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Figure 7. Top-3 Accuracy of CNN on CIFAR10 with gambler.
be positive. To test the performance of Krum and Multi-
Krum, we set q = 8 for these two algorithms so that they
can still be executed. Furthermore, we test whether tuning
q can make a difference. The results are shown in Figure 8.
Obviously, whatever q we use, Krum-based algorithms get
stuck around bad solutions.
2 4 6 8
q
0.1
0.2
0.3
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Top-1 accuracy of Krum on MNIST
Top-1 accuracy of Multi-Krum on MNIST
Top-3 accuracy of Krum on CIFAR10
Top-3 accuracy of Multi-Krum on CIFAR10
Figure 8. Accuracy of Krum-based aggregations, at the end of
training, when q varies. With 20 servers, q must satisfy q ≤ 8.
5.5. General Attack with Multiple Servers
We test general Byzantine resilience in this experiment. We
evaluate the robust aggregation rules under a more general
and realistic type of attack. It is very popular to partition
the parameters into disjoint subsets, and use multiple server
nodes to storage and aggregate them (Li et al., 2014a;b; Ho
et al., 2013). We assume that the parameters are evenly par-
titioned and assigned to the server nodes. The attacker picks
one single server, and manipulates any floating number by
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multiplying −1e20, with probability of 0.05%. We call this
attack gambler, because the attacker randomly manipulate
the values, and wish that in some rounds the assumption-
s/prerequisites of the robust aggregation rules are broken,
which crashes the training. Such attack requires less global
information, and can be concentrated on one single server,
which makes it more realistic and easier to implement.
In Figure 6 and 7, we evaluate the performance of all the ro-
bust aggregation rules under the gambler attack. The number
of servers is 20. For Krum, Multi-Krum and MeaMed, the
estimated Byzantine number q is set as 8. We also show the
performance of averaging without Byzantine values as the
benchmark. It is shown that only marginal median MarMed
and “mean around median” MeaMed survive under this at-
tack. The convergence is slightly slower than the averaging
without Byzantine values, but the gaps are small.
5.6. Discussion
As expected, mean aggregation is not Byzantine resilient.
Although medoid is not Byzantine resilient, as proved by
Blanchard et al. (2017), it can still make reasonable progress
under some attacks such as Gaussian attack. Krum, Multi-
Krum, and GeoMed are classic Byzantine resilient but not
dimensional Byzantine resilient. MarMed and MeaMed
are dimensional Byzantine resilient. However, under omni-
scient attack, MarMed suffers from larger variances, which
slow down the convergence.
The gambler attack shows the true advantage of dimensional
Byzantine resilience: higher probability of survival. Under
such attack, chances are that the assumptions/prerequisites
of MarMed and MeaMed may still get broken. However,
their probability of crashing is less than the other algorithms
because dimensional Byzantine resilience generalizes clas-
sic Byzantine resilience. An interesting observation is that
MarMed is slightly better than MeaMed under gambler at-
tack. That is because the estimation of q = 8 is not accurate,
which will cause some unpredictable behavior for MeaMed.
We choose q = 8 because it is the maximal value we can
take for Krum and Multi-Krum.
It is obvious that MeaMed performs best in almost all the
cases. Multi-Krum is also good, except that it is not dimen-
sional Byzantine resilient. The reason why MeaMed and
Multi-Krum have better performance is that they utilize the
extra information of the number of Byzantine values. Note
that MeaMed not only performs just as well as or even better
than Multi-Krum, but also has lower time complexity.
Marginal median MarMed has the cheapest computation.
Its worst case, omniscient attack, is hard to implement in
reality. Thus, for most applications, we suggest MarMed as
an easy-to-implement aggregation rule with robust perfor-
mance, which (importantly) does not require knowledge of
the number of byzantine values.
6. Related Works
There are few papers studying Byzantine resilience for ma-
chine learning algorithms. Our work is closely related
to Blanchard et al. (2017). Another paper (Chen et al.,
2017) proposed grouped geometric median for Byzantine
resilience, with strongly convex functions.
Our approach offers the following important advantages
over the previous work.
• Cheaper computation compared to Krum. Geometric
median has nearly linear (approximately O(nd)) time
complexity (Cohen et al., 2016). Marginal median and
“mean around median” have linear time complexityO(nd)
on average (Blum et al., 1973), while the time complexity
of Krum is O(n2d).
• Less prior knowledge required. Both geometric me-
dian and marginal median do not require q, the number of
Byzantine workers, to be given, while Krum needs q to
calculate the sum of Euclidean distances of the n− q− 2
nearest neighbours. Furthermore, when q is known or
well estimated, MeaMed show better robustness than
Krum and Multi-Krum in most cases.
• Dimensional Byzantine resilience. Marginal median
and “mean around median” tolerate a more general type
of Byzantine failures described in Equation (2) and Def-
inition 5, while Krum and geometric median can only
tolerate the classic Byzantine failures described in Equa-
tion (1) and Definition 2.
• Better support for multiple server nodes. If the en-
tire set of parameters is disjointly partitioned and stored
on multiple server nodes, marginal median and “mean
around median” need no additional communication, while
Krum and geometric median requires communication
among the server nodes.
7. Conclusion
We investigate the generalized Byzantine resilience of pa-
rameter server architecture. We proposed three novel
median-based aggregation rules for synchronous SGD. The
algorithms have low time complexity and provable conver-
gence to critical points. Our empirical results show good
performance in practice.
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8. Appendix
In the appendix, we introduce several useful lemmas and
use them to derive the detailed proofs of the theorems in
this paper.
8.1. Dimensional Byzantine Resilience
Theorem 1. Averaging is not dimensional Byzantine re-
silient.
Proof. We demonstrate a counter example. Consider the
case where
v˜i =
{
vi, ∀i ∈ [n− 1]
−g −∑n−1i=1 vi, i = n, (3)
where g = E[vi], ∀i ∈ [n]. Thus, the resulting aggregation
isAggr = −g/n. The inner product 〈E[Aggr], g〉 is always
negative under the Byzantine attack. Thus, SGD is not
expectedly descendant, which means it will not converge
to critical points. Note that in this counter example, the
number of Byzantine values of each dimension is 1.
Hence, averaging is not dimensional (α, q)-Byzantine re-
silient with ∀α,∀q > 0.
Theorem 2. Any aggregation rule Aggr({v˜i : i ∈ [n]})
that outputs Aggr ∈ {v˜i : i ∈ [n]} is not dimensional
Byzantine resilient.
Proof. We demonstrate a counter example. Consider the
case where the ith dimension of the ith vector vi is ma-
nipulated by the malicious workers (e.g. multiplied by an
arbitrarily large negative value), where i ∈ [n]. Thus, up to
1 value of each dimension is Byzantine. However, no matter
which vector is chosen, as long as the aggregation is chosen
from {v˜i : i ∈ [n]}, the inner product 〈E[Aggr], g〉 can be
arbitrarily large negative value under the Byzantine attack.
Thus, SGD is not expectedly descendant, which means it
will not converge to critical points.
Hence, any aggregation rule that outputs Aggr ∈ {v˜i :
i ∈ [n]} is not dimensional (α, q)-Byzantine resilient with
∀α,∀q > 0.
8.2. Geometric Median
We use the following lemma (Minsker et al., 2015; Cohen
et al., 2016) without proof to bound the geometric median.
Lemma 3. Let z1, . . . , zn denote n points in a Hilbert
space. Let z∗ denote a (1 + )-approximation of
their geometric median, i.e.,
∑
i∈[n] ‖z∗ − zi‖ ≤ (1 +
)minz
∑
i∈[n] ‖z− zi‖ for  ≥ 0. For any q such that qn ∈
(0, 1/2) and given r ∈ R, if∑i∈[n] 1‖zi‖≤r ≥ (1− q/n)n,
then
‖z∗‖ ≤ cqr + cz,
where cq = 2n−2qn−2q , cz =
minz
∑
i∈[n] ‖z−zi‖
n−2q .
Ideally, the geometric median ( = 0) ignores the second
term cz .
Using the lemma above, we can prove the classic Byzantine
resilience of geometric median.
Theorem 3. Let v1, . . . , vn be any i.i.d. random d-
dimensional vectors s.t. vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and
E‖G− g‖2 = dσ2. q of {vi : i ∈ [n]} are replaced by arbi-
trary d-dimensional vectors b1, . . . , bq . If q ≤ dn2 e − 1 and
η1(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, where η1(n, q) = 2n−2qn−2q
√
n− q, then
the GeoMed function is classic (α1, q)-Byzantine resilient
where 0 ≤ α1 < pi/2 is defined by sinα1 = η1(n,q)
√
dσ
‖g‖ .
Proof. We only need to prove that GeoMed(·) satisfies
the two conditions of classic (α1, q)-Byzantine resilience
defined in Definition 2.
Condition (i):
Let the sequence {v˜j : j ∈ [n]} be defined as
v˜j =
{
vj , for correct j,
arbitrary, for Byzantine j.
Let λ denote the geometric median of {v˜j : j ∈ [n]}. Thus,
z∗ = λ− g is the geometric median of {v˜j − g : j ∈ [n]}.
Using Lemma 3, and taking r = maxcorrect j ‖v˜j − g‖,
under the assumption q ≤ dn2 e − 1 < n/2, we obtain
‖λ− g‖ ≤ 2n− 2q
n− 2q maxcorrect j ‖v˜j − g‖.
Now, we can bound ‖E[λ]− g‖2 as follows:
‖E[λ]− g‖2
≤ E‖λ− g‖2 (Jensen’s inequality)
≤ E
[(
2n− 2q
n− 2q
)2
max
correct j
‖v˜j − g‖2
]
≤ E
(2n− 2q
n− 2q
)2 ∑
correct j
‖v˜j − g‖2

=
(
2n− 2q
n− 2q
)2
(n− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η21(n,q)
dσ2.
By assumption, η1(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, i.e. E[λ] belongs to a
ball centered at g with radius η1(n, q)
√
dσ. This implies
〈E[λ], g〉 ≥ (1− sin2 α1)‖g‖2 ≥ (1− sinα1)‖g‖2,
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where sinα1 = η1(n, q)
√
dσ/‖g‖.
Condition (ii):
We re-use Lemma 3 by taking z∗ = λ, zi = v˜i for ∀i ∈ [n],
and r = maxcorrect j ‖v˜j‖. Thus, we have
‖λ‖ ≤ cq maxcorrect j ‖v˜j‖ ≤ cq
∑
correct j
‖v˜j‖.
Without loss of generality, we denote the sequence {v˜j :
correct j} as {v1, . . . , vn−q}. Thus, there exists a constant
c0 such that
‖λ‖r ≤ c0
∑
r1+...+rn−q=r
‖v1‖r1 . . . ‖vn−q‖rn−q .
Since vi’s are i.i.d., we obtain that E‖λ‖r is bounded
above by a linear combination of terms of the form
E‖v1‖r1 . . .E‖vn−q‖rn−q = E‖G‖r1 . . .E‖G‖rn−q with
r1 + . . .+ rn−q = r, which completes the proof of condi-
tion (ii).
8.3. Marginal Median
We use the following lemma to bound the one-dimensional
median.
Lemma 4. For a sequence composed of q Byzantine values
and n− q correct values u1, . . . , un−q , if q ≤ dn2 e − 1 (the
correct value dominates the sequence), then the median
value m of this sequence satisfies m ∈ [mini ui,maxi ui],
i ∈ [n].
Proof. If m comes from correct values, then the result is
trivial. Thus, we only need to consider the cases where m
comes from Byzantine values.
If n is odd, then in the sorted sequence, there will be n−12
values on both sides of m. However, the number of correct
values n−q ≥ n+12 > n−12 . Thus, on both sides ofm, there
will be at least one correct value, which yields the desired
result.
Furthermore, if n is even, we can re-use the same technique
above to prove m ∈ [mini ui,maxi ui].
Theorem 4. Let v1, . . . , vn be any i.i.d. random d-
dimensional vectors s.t. vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and
E‖G − g‖2 = dσ2. For any dimension j ∈ [d], q of
{(v1)j , . . . , (vn)j} are replaced by arbitrary values, where
(vi)j is the jth dimension of the vector vi. If q ≤ dn2 e − 1
and η2(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, where η2(n, q) = √n− q, then
the MarMed function is dimensional (α2, q)-Byzantine
resilient where 0 ≤ α2 < pi/2 is defined by sinα2 =
η2(n,q)
√
dσ
‖g‖ .
Proof. We only need to prove thatMarMed(·) satisfies the
two conditions of dimensional (α2, q)-Byzantine resilience
defined in Definition 5.
Condition (i):
Without loss of generality, we assume that E[Gi−gi]2 = σ2i ,
E‖G − g‖2 = E∑di=1[Gi − gi]2 =∑di=1 σ2i = dσ2. For
any dimension j ∈ [d], let the sequence {(v˜1)j , . . . , (v˜n)j}
be defined as
(v˜i)j =
{
(vi)j , for correct j,
arbitrary, for Byzantine j.
For the jth dimension, j ∈ [d], the median value µj ∈
[mincorrect i(v˜i)j ,maxcorrect i(v˜i)j ].
Thus, we have
E[µj − gj ]2 ≤ E
[
max
correct i
((v˜i)j − gj)2
]
≤ E
[ ∑
correct i
((v˜i)j − gj)2
]
=
∑
correct i
E
[
((v˜i)j − gj)2
]
= (n− q)E[Gj − gj ]2 (i.i.d. over i)
= (n− q)σ2j .
Now, we can bound ‖E[µ]− g‖2 as follows:
‖E[µ]− g‖2 ≤ E‖µ− g‖2 (Jensen’s inequality)
= E
 d∑
j=1
(µj − gj)2
 = d∑
j=1
E
[
(µj − gj)2
]
≤
d∑
j=1
(n− q)σ2j = (n− q)
d∑
j=1
σ2j = (n− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η22(n,q)
dσ2.
By assumption, η2(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, i.e. E[µ] belongs to a
ball centered at g with radius η2(n, q)
√
dσ. This implies
〈E[µ], g〉 ≥ (1− sin2 α2)‖g‖2 ≥ (1− sinα2)‖g‖2,
where sinα2 = η2(n, q)
√
dσ/‖g‖.
Condition (ii):
By using the equivalence of norms in finite dimension, there
exists a constant c1 such that
‖µ‖ =
√√√√ d∑
j=1
µ2j ≤
√√√√ d∑
j=1
max
correct i
(v˜i)2j
≤
√√√√ d∑
j=1
∑
correct i
(v˜i)2j =
√ ∑
correct i
‖v˜i‖2
≤ c1
∑
correct i
‖v˜i‖.
(equivalence between `2-norm and `1-norm)
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Without loss of generality, we denote the sequence {v˜i :
correct i} as {v1, . . . , vn−q}. Thus, there exists a constant
c2 such that
‖µ‖r ≤ c2
∑
r1+...+rn−q=r
‖v1‖r1 . . . ‖vn−q‖rn−q .
Since vi’s are i.i.d., we obtain that E‖µ‖r is bounded
above by a linear combination of terms of the form
E‖v1‖r1 . . .E‖vn−q‖rn−q = E‖G‖r1 . . .E‖G‖rn−q with
r1 + . . .+ rn−q = r, which completes the proof of condi-
tion (ii).
8.4. Mean around Median
The following lemma bounds the one-dimensional mean
around median.
Lemma 5. For a sequence (of scalar values) composed of
q Byzantine values and n− q correct values u1, . . . , un−q,
if q ≤ dn2 e − 1 (the correct value dominates the sequence),
then the mean-around-median value ρ (defined in Defini-
tion 8) and the median µ (defined in Definition 7) of this
sequence satisfies |ρ− µ| ≤ maxi |ui − µ|.
Proof. According to the definition of the mean around me-
dian ρ, it is the mean value over the top-(n− 1) values in
the sequence, nearest to the median µ. Denote such set of
nearest values as {w1, . . . , wn−q}. If any wi satisfies that
|wi − µ| > maxi |ui − µ|, then it cannot be in the set of
the top-(n− q) nearest values because all the n− q correct
values are nearer to µ (|ui − µ| ≤ maxi |ui − µ|). Since all
wi satisfies |wi−µ| ≤ maxi |ui−µ|, the average over them
must also satisfies | 1n−q
∑
i wi − µ| ≤ maxi |ui − µ|.
Theorem 5. Let v1, . . . , vn be any i.i.d. random d-
dimensional vectors s.t. vi ∼ G, with E[G] = g and
E‖G − g‖2 = dσ2. For any dimension j ∈ [d], q of
{(v1)j , . . . , (vn)j} are replaced by arbitrary values, where
(vi)j is the jth dimension of the vector vi. If q ≤ dn2 e−1 and
η3(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, where η3(n, q) =
√
10(n− q), then
the MeaMed function is dimensional (α3, q)-Byzantine
resilient where 0 ≤ α3 < pi/2 is defined by sinα3 =
η3(n,q)
√
dσ
‖g‖ .
Proof. We only need to prove that MeaMed(·) satisfies
the two conditions of (α3, q)-Byzantine resilience defined
in Definition 5.
Condition (i):
Without loss of generality, we assume that E[Gi−gi]2 = σ2i ,
E‖G − g‖2 = E∑di=1[Gi − gi]2 =∑di=1 σ2i = dσ2. For
any dimension j ∈ [d], let the sequence {(v˜1)j , . . . , (v˜n)j}
be defined as
(v˜i)j =
{
(vi)j , for correct j,
arbitrary, for Byzantine j.
For the jth dimension, j ∈ [d], using Lemma 5, we have
|ρj − µj | ≤ maxcorrect i |(v˜i)j − µj |, where µj is the
median of the jth dimension.
Thus, we have
E[ρj − gj ]2
≤ 2E[ρj − µj ]2 + 2E[µj − gj ]2
≤ 2E max
correct i
[(v˜i)j − µj ]2 + 2E[µj − gj ]2
≤ 4E max
correct i
[(v˜i)j − gj ]2 + 6E[µj − gj ]2
≤ 10E
[
max
correct i
((v˜i)j − gj)2
]
≤ 10E
[ ∑
correct i
((v˜i)j − gj)2
]
= 10
∑
correct i
E
[
((v˜i)j − gj)2
]
= 10(n− q)E[Gj − gj ]2 (i.i.d. over i)
= 10(n− q)σ2j .
Now, we can bound ‖E[ρ]− g‖2 as follows:
‖E[ρ]− g‖2 ≤ E‖ρ− g‖2 (Jensen’s inequality)
= E
 d∑
j=1
(ρj − gj)2
 = d∑
j=1
E
[
(ρj − gj)2
]
≤
d∑
j=1
10(n− q)σ2j = 10(n− q)
d∑
j=1
σ2j = 10(n− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η23(n,q)
dσ2.
By assumption, η3(n, q)
√
dσ < ‖g‖, i.e. E[ρ] belongs to a
ball centered at g with radius η3(n, q)
√
dσ. This implies
〈E[ρ], g〉 ≥ (1− sin2 α3)‖g‖2 ≥ (1− sinα3)‖g‖2,
where sinα3 = η3(n, q)
√
dσ/‖g‖.
Condition (ii):
By using the equivalence of norms in finite dimension, there
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exists a constant c3 such that
‖ρ‖ =
√√√√ d∑
j=1
ρ2j
≤
√√√√ d∑
j=1
2[ρj − µj ]2 + 2µ2j
≤
√√√√ d∑
j=1
max
correct i
2[(v˜i)j − µj ]2 + 2µ2j
≤
√√√√ d∑
j=1
10 max
correct i
(v˜i)2j
≤
√√√√10 d∑
j=1
∑
correct i
(v˜i)2j =
√
10
∑
correct i
‖v˜i‖2
≤ c3
∑
correct i
‖v˜i‖.
(equivalence between `2-norm and `1-norm)
Without loss of generality, we denote the sequence {v˜i :
correct i} as {v1, . . . , vn−q}. Thus, there exists a constant
c4 such that
‖ρ‖r ≤ c4
∑
r1+...+rn−q=r
‖v1‖r1 . . . ‖vn−q‖rn−q .
Since vi’s are i.i.d., we obtain that E‖ρ‖r is bounded
above by a linear combination of terms of the form
E‖v1‖r1 . . .E‖vn−q‖rn−q = E‖G‖r1 . . .E‖G‖rn−q with
r1 + . . .+ rn−q = r, which completes the proof of condi-
tion (ii).
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8.5. Experimental Details
In Table 8.5 and 8.5, we show the detailed network struc-
tures of the MLP and CNN used in our experiments.
Table 2. MLP Summary
Layer (type) Parameters Previous Layer
flatten(Flatten) null data
fc1(FullyConnected) #output=128 flatten
relu1(Activation) null fc1
fc2(FullyConnected) #output=128 relu1
relu2(Activation) null fc2
fc3(FullyConnected) #output=10 relu2
softmax(SoftmaxOutput) null fc3
Table 3. CNN Summary
Layer (type) Parameters Previous Layer
conv1(Convolution) channels=32, kernel size=3, padding=1 data
activation1(Activation) null conv1
conv2(Convolution) channels=32, kernel size=3, padding=1 activation1
activation2(Activation) null conv2
pooling1(Pooling) pool size=2 activation2
dropout1(Dropout) probability=0.2 pooling1
conv3(Convolution) channels=64, kernel size=3, padding=1 dropout1
activation2(Activation) null conv3
conv4(Convolution) channels=64, kernel size=3, padding=1 activation2
activation4(Activation) null conv4
pooling2(Pooling) pool size=2 activation4
dropout2(Dropout) probability=0.2 pooling2
flatten1(Flatten) null dropout2
fc1(FullyConnected) #output=512 flatten1
activation5(Activation) null fc1
dropout3(Dropout) probability=0.2 activation5
fc2(FullyConnected) #output=512 dropout3
activation6(Activation) null fc2
dropout4(Dropout) probability=0.2 activation6
fc3(FullyConnected) #output=10 dropout4
softmax(SoftmaxOutput) null fc3
Generalized Byzantine-tolerant SGD
8.6. Additional Experiments
In this section, we illustrate the additional empirical results.
In Figure 9, we illustrate the top-1 accuracy of MLP on
MNIST when batch-size varies, without Byzantine failures.
The learning rate is
γ =
0.1× batchsize
32
.
The results show that when there is no Byzantine fail-
ures, GeoMed, Multi-Krum, and MeaMed performs just
like Mean. MarMed has slightly slower convergence. Krum
and Medoid are the slowest. The gap is narrowed when the
batch size increases.
In Figure 10, we illustrate the top-1 accuracy of MLP on
MNIST with gambler attack, when the estimated q varies for
Krum, Multi-Krum, and MeaMed. Mean without Byzantine
failures and MarMed are used as baselines. No matter what
q we use, the Krum-based algorithms always crash. For
MeaMed, when the estimated q is too small (e.g., q = 2), it
will also crash. In most cases, MeaMed performs well. The
performance of MeaMed is similar to MarMed.
We illustrate all the experimental results of CNN on CI-
FAR10 additional to Section 5. For completeness, we also
illustrate the experimental results of MLP on MNIST. The
results are shown in Figure 11-20. In general, all the experi-
ments of CNN on CIFAR10 show similar results with the
experiments of MLP on MNIST.
Generalized Byzantine-tolerant SGD
8  16 32 64 128
Batch size
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
To
p-
1 
ac
cu
ra
cy
Mean
Krum
Medoid
GeoMed
MarMed
Multi-Krum
MeaMed
(a) MLP on MNIST without Byzantine with different batch sizes
Figure 9. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST without Byzantine failures, when batch size varies. The learning rate is γ = 0.1×batchsize
32
.
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Figure 10. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with gambler attack, when q varies
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(a) MLP on MNIST without Byzantine
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(b) MLP on MNIST without Byzantine (zoomed)
Figure 11. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST without Byzantine failures.
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(a) MLP on MNIST with Gaussian
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(b) MLP on MNIST with Gaussian (zoomed)
Figure 12. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with Gaussian Attack. 6 out of 20 gradient vectors are replaced by i.i.d. random vectors
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and 200 standard deviation.
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(a) MLP on MNIST with omniscient
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(b) MLP on MNIST with omniscient (zoomed)
Figure 13. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with Omniscient Attack. 6 out of 20 gradient vectors are replaced by the negative sum of
all the correct gradients, scaled by a large constant (1e20 in the experiments).
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(a) MLP on MNIST with bit-flip
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(b) MLP on MNIST with bit-flip (zoomed)
Figure 14. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with Bit-flip Attack. For the first 1000 dimensions, 1 of the 20 floating numbers is
manipulated by flipping the 22th, 30th, 31th and 32th bits.
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(a) MLP on MNIST with gambler
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(b) MLP on MNIST with gambler (zoomed)
Figure 15. Top-1 accuracy of MLP on MNIST with gambler attack. The parameters are evenly assigned to 20 servers. For one single
server, any received value is multiplied by −1e20 with probability 0.05%.
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Figure 16. Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 without Byzantine failures
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Figure 17. Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 with Gaussian Attack
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Figure 18. Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 with Omniscient Attack
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Figure 19. Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 with Bit-flip Attack
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Figure 20. Top-3 Accuracy of CNN VS. # rounds evaluated on CIFAR10 with Gambler attack.
